

# The Insurer Channel of Monetary Policy

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
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# How do NBFIs shape transmission of monetary policy?

- NBFIs are important drivers of US credit supply



- Life insurers: Largest lenders, granular investment data

## Insurers face tradeoff between asset duration and returns

- Insurers are short duration
  - Very long-term liabilities, scarce long-term corporate bonds
- Tradeoff between LT Treasuries and MT corporate bonds
- Use transaction-level data to establish tradeoff

# Insurers transmit MP to credit risk premia through LT risk-free rates

- Insurer channel of MP:
  - $MP \Rightarrow \uparrow \text{LT treasury yield} \Rightarrow \downarrow \text{corp bond demand} \Rightarrow \uparrow \text{credit risk premia}$
- Identify channel using insurance specific regulatory reform

## Selected literature

1. Life insurance investments: Becker Ivashina (2015), Ozdagli Wang (2019)
  - This paper: [Cross asset class tradeoff between corporate bonds and LT treasuries](#)
2. MP affects the entire yield curve: Hanson Stein (2015), Hanson Lucca Wright (2021), Domanski Sushko Shin (2017), Greenwood Vayanos (2014)
  - This paper: [Relate to variations in corporate bond demand and credit risk premia](#)
3. Monetary policy and credit risk premia: Palazzo Yamarthy (2022), Anderson Cesa-Bianchi (2023), Dreschler Savov Schnabl (2018), Bekaert Hoerova Duca (2013), Chava Hsu (2019), Foley-Fisher Ramcharan Yu (2016)
  - This paper: [Non-bank transmission to credit risk premia](#)

# Overview

1. Data
2. Context: Insurers' duration mismatch
3. Tradeoff: Corporate bonds vs. long-term treasuries
4. MP transmission via life insurers
5. Conclusion

# Data

- Bond-level daily transactions and quarterly holdings for US insurers: Regulatory data via S&P Capital IQ Pro
- Corporate bond characteristics, bond ratings: Mergent FISD
- Treasury bond characteristics: TreasuryDirect
- Daily corporate bond yields, prices: TRACE
- Stock price information: CRSP
- Corporate balance sheet information: Compustat

Insurers' duration mismatch




## Life insurers are short duration

Two Factor Model Specification (Hartley Paulson Rosen 2016, Kojien Yogo 2023):


$$R_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta R_{m,t} + \gamma R_{10,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$R_{i,t}$ : return on insurance portfolio in week  $t$ ,  $R_{m,t}$ : return on value-weighted stock market portfolio in week  $t$ ,  $R_{10,t}$ : the return on 10 yr treasury bond in week  $t$




# Insurers attempt to extend asset duration

- Sample of all corporate bonds issued from 2015-2023:



(a) Bond maturity of issuances




(b) Bond maturity of insurer purchases


Tradeoff: Corporate bonds vs. long-term Treasuries

# Relative demand sharply drops below LT Treasury yields

- Isolate demand by focusing on insurer purchase shares *within* individual bonds



(a) Relative demand



(b) Credit risk premia

T10 Spread

EBP Derivation

## Formal threshold analysis


- Employ a search technique (Hansen 2000, Card Mas Rothstein 2008):

$$\text{Purchase Share}_{c,y} = \alpha_y + \delta_y \mathbb{1}[s_y > s_y^*] + \epsilon_{c,y}$$


for  $0 \leq s_y \leq S$ , where  $y$ : issuance year,  $c$ : CUSIP,  $s$ : T30 spread,  $s^*$ : threshold spread

- We select  $s_y^*$  to maximize  $R^2$ , separately for each year

## LT Treasury yield is consistently a floor



(a) T30 spread threshold for relative demand




(b) T30 spread threshold for credit risk premia

## Insurer relative demand driven by LT Treasury yield comparison

$$\text{Purchase Share}_{c,m} = \alpha_i + \delta_m + \beta_1 \text{T30 Spread}_{c,m} + X_{c,m} + e_{c,m}$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T30 Spread	1.32** (0.53)	6.66*** (0.73)	2.49*** (0.64)	2.42*** (0.59)
Duration			1.05*** (0.11)	1.11*** (0.10)
Distance to Default			3.67** (1.45)	1.80 (1.53)
Log(Offering Amount)				-7.20*** (1.47)
1{Callable}				-1.04 (2.26)
Observations	3932	3932	3932	3932
$R^2$	0.006	0.531	0.565	0.593
Issuer FE	no	yes	yes	yes
Time FE	no	yes	yes	yes
SE Clustering		Issue + Time		

## Use insurance-specific regulatory reform to identify tradeoff




$\uparrow$  RBC  $\Rightarrow$   $\downarrow$  attractiveness of corporate bonds  $\Rightarrow$   $\uparrow$  binding tradeoff



## Tradeoff more binding post insurance regulatory reform

$$\text{Purchase Share}_c = \alpha_i + \delta_q + \sum_{q=2015Q1}^{2023Q1} \beta_q \times (\Delta\text{RBC}_r \times \text{T30 Spread}_c \times \mathbf{1}_q) + X_{c,t} + \epsilon_c$$



## LT Treasury yield shapes demand at asset-class level

$$\text{Purchase Share}_{r,m} = \delta_m + \beta \times (\Delta\text{RBC}_r \times \text{T30 Yield}_m \times \mathbb{1}\{\text{Post}\}) + X_{r,m} + \epsilon_{r,m}$$

	(1)	(2)
T30 yield	1.32* (0.74)	
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Post}\} \times \text{T30 yield}$	-2.76 (1.71)	
$\Delta\text{RBC}_r \times \text{T30 yield}$	0.13 (0.12)	0.18 (0.10)
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Post}\} \times \Delta\text{RBC}_r \times \text{T30 yield}$	-0.77** (0.28)	-0.98*** (0.29)
Observations	1348	1348
$R^2$	0.018	0.119
Time FE	no	yes
SE Clustering	Rating + Time	

Monetary policy transmission via life insurers

## Role of insurers in MP transmission

- Identifying MP induced changes in LT treasury yields:
  - Use changes in T30 yields on FOMC announcement days
  - To ensure MP component  $>$  Fed information effect: only include days when bond yields and S&P 500 move in opposite directions (Jarociński Karadi 2021)
- Identifying role of insurers using insurer regulatory reform:
  - Differential impact of MP-induced changes in LT rates to credit risk premia

## Insurers transmit MP-induced changes in T30 yield to risk premia

$$\Delta \text{EBP}_{c,m} = \alpha_c + \delta_m + \beta \times (\Delta \text{RBC}_r \times \Delta \text{T30 Yield}_{\text{MP}} \times \mathbb{1}\{\text{Post}\}) + X_{c,m} + \epsilon_{c,m}$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta \text{T30 Yield}_{\text{MP}}$	15.56 (18.31)		
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Post}\} \times \Delta \text{T30 Yield}_{\text{MP}}$	-125.99*** (34.04)		
$\Delta \text{RBC}_r \times \Delta \text{T30 Yield}_{\text{MP}}$	-2.25 (1.55)	-1.94 (1.53)	-2.20* (1.28)
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Post}\} \times \Delta \text{RBC}_r \times \Delta \text{T30 Yield}_{\text{MP}}$	22.23*** (6.41)	15.12** (6.17)	14.74*** (4.89)
Observations	365703	365703	365703
$R^2$	0.103	0.395	0.412
Issue FE	no	no	yes
Time FE	no	yes	yes
Aggregate Controls	yes	no	no
SE Clustering		Issue + Time	

Conclusion

## Insurer asset allocation tradeoff shapes MP transmission

- Tradeoff between long-term treasuries and medium-term corporate bonds
- New insurer channel of monetary policy
  - Transmit MP-induced changes in LT risk-free rates to credit risk premia
  - Impact in cross section of bonds quantitatively relevant
- Policy implications: Role of NBFIs in MP transmission
- Next steps: Theory, cross-section of insurers, international spillovers

## Appendix



# Transmission of short rates to long rates

- Hanson Lucca Wright 2021 propose three channels:
  1. **Mortgage refinancing**: Negative shocks to short-term rates trigger mortgage refinancing waves that lead to temporary reductions in the effective gross supply of long-term bonds.
  2. **Investor extrapolation**: Some bond investors make biased forecasts of future interest rates. Positive shocks to short rates lead extrapolative investors to overestimate the future path of short rates and demand fewer long-term bonds.
  3. **Reach for yield**: Negative shocks to short rates boost the demand for long-term bonds from “yield-seeking investors”.

Return

## Excess Bond Premium

- Derived as in Gilchrist Zakrajšek (2012)
- Component of credit spreads not directly attributable to expected default risk



$$\ln S_{i,t}[k] = \beta DTD_{i,t} + \gamma' Z_{i,t}[k] + \epsilon_{i,t}[k]$$

$$\hat{S}_{i,t}[k] = \exp \left[ \hat{\beta} DTD_{i,t} + \hat{\gamma}' Z_{i,t}[k] + \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2}{2} \right]$$

$$EBP_{i,t}[k] = S_{i,t}[k] - \hat{S}_{i,t}[k]$$


Return

# Relative demand and 10 Year Treasury yields



Return

## Relative demand of LT Treasury bonds increases with LT yields



Return

# Tradeoff

- 30 year Treasury bond:

$$y_t^{30} = \underbrace{\frac{1}{30} \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{30-1} y_k \right\}}_{\text{Expected Rates}} + \underbrace{\tau^{30}}_{\text{Term Premium}}$$

- 10 year Corporate bond:

$$y_c^{10} = \underbrace{\frac{1}{10} \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{10-1} y_k \right\}}_{\text{Expected Rates}} + \underbrace{\tau^{10}}_{\text{Term Premium}} + \underbrace{\delta_c}_{\text{Credit Risk Premium}}$$

- Capital-adjusted T30 spread:

$$\{y_c^{10} - y_t^{30}\}_{Cap. Adj} = \underbrace{\delta_c}_{\text{Credit Risk Premium}} - \underbrace{\tau^{10,30}}_{\text{Term Premium}} - \underbrace{\eta_c}_{\text{RBC}}$$

## Differential effects of LT Treasury Yield on risk premia

$$\Delta \text{EBP}_{c,m} = \alpha_c + \delta_m + \beta \times (\Delta \text{RBC}_{\text{rat}} \times \Delta \text{T30 Yield}_m \times \mathbb{1}\{\text{Post}\}) + X_{c,m} + \epsilon_{c,m}$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta \text{T30 Yield}$	-9.53*** (3.34)		
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Post}\} \times \Delta \text{T30 Yield}$	15.62*** (4.15)		
$\Delta \text{RBC}_{\text{rat}} \times \Delta \text{T30 Yield}$	-0.46** (0.22)	-0.65** (0.25)	-0.64*** (0.24)
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Post}\} \times \Delta \text{RBC}_{\text{rat}} \times \Delta \text{T30 Yield}$	0.77** (0.34)	0.77** (0.33)	0.68** (0.31)
Observations	547262	547262	547262
$R^2$	0.100	0.363	0.376
CUSIP FE	no	no	yes
Time FE	no	yes	yes
Aggregate Controls	yes	no	no

## MP-induced changes in T30 yield increase risk premia

$$\Delta EBP_{c,m} = \alpha_c + \beta \times \Delta T30 \text{ Yield}_{MP} + X_m + \epsilon_{c,m}$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta T30 \text{ Yield}_{MP}$	5.55 (16.39)	4.04 (17.10)		
$\Delta T30 \text{ Yield}$			-10.27* (6.01)	-8.33* (4.59)
Observations	372177	372177	372177	372177
$R^2$	0.024	0.082	0.054	0.100
CUSIP FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Aggregate Controls	no	yes	no	yes

Return